Introduction
Climate change negotiations have favored a multilateral approach over the last two decades that has yielded only a limited success. Given these di¢culties, Benedick (2007) questioned already some years ago whether this was a good strategy for climate change. In fact, as the author points out, the main success story in international environmental agreements, the Montreal Protocol, was adopted following a sequential path 1 (Benedick, 1998) . This issue resembles the question of whether regionalism or multilateralism is the most e §ective strategy for achieving global free trade, which has been debated extensively in international economics (Bhagwati, 1993; Yi, 1996) . As noted by Aghion et al. (2007) , another way of posing this question is to ask whether multilateral or sequential bargaining 2 is more likely to lead to a global agreement. Aghion et al. (2007) focus on Free Trade Agreements (FTA) but state that their results may also be applied to International Environmental Agreements (IEA), as their model is based on a partition function approach 3 . The authors propose a model where one leader country endogenously chooses whether to negotiate sequentially or multilaterally, assuming that the leader makes only take-it-or-leave-it o §ers. The key message is that the grand coalition is always formed and that the leader prefers multilateral negotiations if the game has positive coalition externalities. For the FTA game, positive and negative externalities may arise, the latter mainly due to political economy reasons, but for the IEA game externalities are clearly positive (Barrett, 1994; Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Finus and CaparrÛs, 2015) . Hence, their model predicts that IEA will always be negotiated multilaterally.
Assuming that a country plays a leader role in international negotiations is a reasonable assumption not only for trade negotiations but also for environmental negotiations. During the negotiations of the Montreal Protocol the US played a clear leader role (Benedick, 1998; Sandler, 2004) , and in climate change negotiations both, the US and the EU, have played this role at di §erent times 4 . Nevertheless, it is most likely too strong an assumption that the leader only makes take-it-or-leave-it o §ers, as in Aghion et al. (2007) . The implication is that the entire surplus generated by the agreement is appropriated by the leader (the US in their discussion), while the other countries of the world are indi §erent between facing unrestricted climate change and cooperating. We therefore propose a dynamic model that fully speciÖes the bargaining process and in which a leading country endogenously decides whether to negotiate multilaterally or sequentially (it is the agenda-setter), but in which distribution of the surplus is endogenously determined by the bargaining protocol followed. In each stage, we assume that bargaining takes place ‡ la Rubinstein (1982) between the di §erent players involved (building on Huang (2002) , when three or more players bargain). Changing this assumption has profound implications on the results obtained, showing that sequential bargaining may be chosen with positive externalities and that the choice is determined by the convexity of the game.
The second di §erence between our model and Aghionís et al. is that we introduce discounting 5 , a crucial feature to model climate change negotiations as delaying an agreement has costs. As sequential bargaining implies welfare losses once discounting is introduced, even in equilibrium, we postulate that there is an international agency (e.g. the UNFCCC Secretariat) that can intervene in the negotiations. This mediator or facilitating agency does not have the power to impose an agreement. Instead, we assume that, through lobbying, the organization of international conferences and meetings, or other means, the facilitating agency only has the power to ináuence the amount of time that elapses between negotiation stages or the amount of time that elapses between o §ers in the intra-stage negotiation. Our results show the circumstances under which such mediator has a role to play, and that it will generally have an incentive to separate the negotiation rounds (or stages in our model) to induce the leader to choose multilateral bargaining.
Our benchmark model assumes that all players terminate an agreement if one country breaks it. This assumption is responsible for the result that the grand coalition is achieved, regardless of the path followed. The same assumption was implicit in Aghionís et al. (2007) and has been applied to climate change negotiations by CaparrÛs et al. (2004) or Harstad (2012) . However, this is not the standard assumption in IEA analyses, which generally look for "self-enforcing" agreements 6 (Barrett, 1994) . IEA analyses generally use the concept of 224), this lack of a clear leader explains the di¢culties encountered in reaching an e §ective agreement. 5 As in any bargaining model, the discount factor summarizes all reasons why a deal is more valuable the sooner it is reached (Muthoo, 1999) . The reasons can be impatience, haggling costs, or that a climate threshold may be reached during the negotiations if they continue. 6 Barrett (1994) popularized in the IEA literature the term "self-enforcing" to refer to agreements reached under the assumption that countries will continue cooperating when one country defects. However, this may be confusing to some readers as the term "self-enforcing" was also popularized by Telser (1980) in the context of repeated interactions, and for Telser a self-enforcing agreement implies that "if one party takes an internal and external stability (díAspremont, 1983) . This solution concept assumes that all countries believe that if one country leaves a coalition the remaining countries will continue cooperating, which is most likely not so far fetched for international negotiations. Countries can certainly not assume that international agreements are completely binding because enforcement at the international level is rather weak (although the assumption that international agreements are not binding at all is also not satisfactory). In addition, Parties to a treaty tend to continue cooperating even if one country fails to do so, at least if the number of countries involved is large 7 . Real-life climate change negotiations provide examples for the IEA game (although Canada announced that it was not meeting its commitment under the Kyoto Protocol, the European Union continued its e §orts to meet its targets). We show that if the free-riding incentives are smaller for the leader than for the followers, sequential bargaining will be chosen more often under this alternative assumption. Furthermore, we show that a stable grand-coalition may be achieved following a sequential path if coalitions consolidate 8 and superadditivity holds, and that if the grand coalition is not stable in a multilateral setting, the sequential approach may, in fact, be the only way to reach a stable global agreement.
As already mentioned, the model presented here is at the intersection of two strands of literature. On one side is the literature on FTA. Aghion et al. (2007) is the closest precedent, but there are a large number of papers on this issue. Sen and Biswas (2015) extend Aghionís et al. analysis to di §erent protocols for the multilateral option, keeping the assumption of take-it-or-leave-it o §ers and the absence of discounting. Using a political economy approach, Levy (1997) and Krishna (1998) show that bilateral FTAs can undermine political support for further multilateral trade liberalization. On the contrary, Saggi and Yildiz (2010 and 2011) show that bilateral FTAs can be necessary to achieve global free trade in a three player model (they focus on the impact of banning bilateral agreements). Other analyses of the FTA game can be found in Yi (1996) , who analyzes a game with identical players and particular functions, showing that the grand coalition is achieved under the open membership rule, or in Macho-Stadler and Xue (2007), who use a three player model to discuss the winners and losers in a sequential coalition formation game. action. . . [that]. . . constitutes a violation of the agreement, then the theory assumes that the victim responds by terminating the agreement". Note that this resembles the assumption in our benchmark model. 7 If there are only three countries it is hard to believe that if one country leaves an agreement the other two will continue cooperating under the terms of the old agreement. 8 Consolidation of coalitions means an intermediate coalition cannot break up in subsequent negotiations. In other words, we assume that, if the EU and the US form a coalition Örst, they will develop an integrated emissions trading scheme that makes it impossible for one of them to break up a subsequent deal with China. As discussed in footnote 18, this is not the same than the assumption that one player commits in Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) .
On the other side, there is also an extensive literature applying game theoretic concepts to IEA analysis (see Finus and CaparrÛs (2015) for a survey). Most of these papers assume identical players and model coalition formation as a simultaneous move game (although there is typically a second stage where emissions are determined). The main result is that only a reduced number of countries cooperate (Barrett, 1994) . Closer related to our paper, Asheim et al. (2006) , and previously Carraro and Siniscalco (1998) , among others, have shown that social welfare may be higher with multiple agreements than with a single global agreement. Asheim et al. (2006) propose a dynamic framework with homogeneous players (they also provide an overview of the di §erent papers addressing this issue). However, their focus is di §erent to ours, as they do not allow the two regional coalitions to reach a new agreement to enlarge the scope of cooperation. Examples of sequential games can be found in CaparrÛs et al. (2004) and Finus et al. (2010) . The former is a three player game focused on asymmetric information and the latter analyzes a sequential coalition formation game with heterogeneous players using simulations and an Integrated Assessment Model. Finus et al.ís model is based on the sequential move unanimity game (Bloch, 1995) . In this game (based in turn on Chatterjee et al. (1993) ), an initiator proposes a coalition and if all potential members agree the coalition is formed. Then, a new proposer is selected from the players not participating in the coalition. By contrast, in our model it is the coalition which negotiates with the remaining players to enlarge the coalition. This implies that only one coalition forms in equilibrium, which is more in line with the empirical Önding that all IEA represent single agreements that are gradually extended to cover more countries. Examples where coverage, both in terms of e §ort and in terms of countries, evolves over time are the agreements on ozone depleting substances (the Montreal Protocol and related treaties), on sulphur reduction (the Helsinki Protocol and related treaties), or on nitrogen oxide (the Sophia Protocol and related treaties).
The model 2.1 Benchmark model
Building on Aghion et al. (2007) , we start by considering a transferable-utility game in a world with three countries: a, b, and c. The game is described in partition form and we deÖne a coalition structure as a partition ! of fa; b; cg. A coalition is a group of countries that have agreed to form an IEA. For every partition ! and every player j (singleton or coalition C 2 !), the value function v(j; !) assigns a payo § to j given the coalition structure ! (this payo § is gross of lump-sum transfers).
One country is the leader, which means that it is the agenda-setter (without loss of generality, we assign this role to country c). In the Örst stage of the game, the leader chooses between multilateral and sequential bargaining. As we are looking for a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), country c chooses the path that maximizes its payo §.
If the leader goes for sequential bargaining, it has to decide whether to bargain Örst with a or with b (we discuss in detail only the case where it approaches a Örst, as the other subgame is symmetric). One of the di §erences with Aghion et al. (2007) is that we substitute take-it-or-leave-it o §ers for an alternate o §ers bargaining framework. If the leader negotiates Örst with a the o §er consists of a coalition between a and c and lump-sum transfers from c to a a. Country a can accept the o §er, or reject it and make a counter-o §er to c, which may be accepted by c or rejected with a new counter-o §er. The alternative-o §ers protocol ‡ la Rubinstein follows until an agreement is reached, yielding a payo § of P (i; " ac ; s a ) for i = a; c if the coalition is not expanded further, where s a indicates that the sequential process started with a; and " ac = hfacg; fbgi indicates that a and c form a coalition (where there is no risk of confusion, we write P i instead of P (i; " ac ; s a )). In case of perpetual disagreement 9 between a and c, the coalition structure is " $ = hfag; fbg; fcgi. In this intra-stage 10 negotiations, o §ers are made at discrete points in time, and the duration of the period between o §ers is ( > 0: Thus, the discount factor in the intra-stage negotiations is + = e !r& t < 1; where r > 0 is the discount rate and t = f0; 1; 2; :::g are the periods when the o §ers are made.
Whenever a and c reach an agreement, the coalition facg proceeds to bargain with b. However, after the Örst negotiation (between a and c) and before the second negotiation (between facg and b) starts, a period of duration 0 > 0 elapses. Thus, the inter-stage discount factor is 1 = e !r(t < 1 (that is we consider two discount factors, although there is only one discount rate). The new negotiation then starts with an o §er from facg to b, o §ering an expansion of the coalition to include all three countries and lump-sum transfers from facg to b. If b accepts the o §er, the coalition structure is " abc = hfabcgi, and each player i receives a payo § equal to P (i; " abc ; s a ). If b rejects the o §er, it proposes a countero §er to facg, which may be accepted or rejected with a new counter-o §er, and so on. In case of perpetual disagreement between b and facg; the coalition structure is " ac = hfacg; fbgi.
If c chooses multilateral bargaining, it bargains simultaneously with both follower countries. Thus, country c makes an o §er that consists of a coalition including all countries and a system of lump-sum transfers. The transfers determine the payo §s P (i; "; m) of countries i 2 c; a; b (where m stands for multilateral). Following Huang (2002) , we allow for conditional and unconditional o §ers. A conditional o §er only binds if both countries accept the o §er, while an unconditional o §er only binds between the proposer and the country accepting the o §er 11 . In the latter case, the proposer buys out the right of the accepting country and continues negotiating with the other country (but within the same negotiation stage). Although we present a more general model in Section 3, for the time being we assume that countries talk following a cyclical protocol c; a; b; c; a; b .... Thus, country a talks second and decides to accept the o §er or to make a counter-o §er, then country b talks and so on. If an o §er is Önally accepted by both countries, ! = hfabcgi is the resulting coalition structure and the game ends. In the event of perpetual disagreement, where no o §er is accepted by all countries, the coalition structure is ! = hfag; fbg; fcgi.
The bilateral bargaining process described in the sequential case above is unproblematic because uniqueness is ensured by Rubinsteinís alternative-o §ers procedure (Rubinstein, 1982) . However, in the multilateral bargaining case requiring unanimity may yield multiple equilibria, as shown by Shaked (reported by Sutton (1986)), if we do not wish to focus solely on the case where the history of the negotiations has no impact. There are di §erent proposals to restoring uniqueness, such as the "exit" game proposed by Krishna and Serrano (1996) or the possibility of making unconditional o §ers Önanced by outside money (Huang, 2002) , which we have decided to follow 12 . Huangís solution has the following welcome features: (i) it degenerates to the Rubinstein Bargaining Solution (RBS) (Rubinstein , 1982) for the case of two players; (ii) it tends to the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) if the discount factor tends to one; and (iii) if all players are allowed to talk once in the cycle, the equilibrium is the same as the unique Stationary SPE of the unanimity game (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990) . It is therefore an adequate generalization of the RBS to more than two players (focusing directly on stationary strategies yields similar results, but this is a strong assumption (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990)). One can see Huangís proposal only as a reÖnement to select the most reasonable equilibria in multilateral bargaining, but allowing for conditional o §ers is also an adequate manner of modeling what actually takes place in international negotiations, as the number of players Önally involved in the key negotiations in a meeting is generally small (with each negotiator representing the interests and positions of a large set of countries). However, one has to accept that the outside money needed to buy out 11 Note that this distinction is not possible in the set of bilateral agreements that take place in the sequential path. 12 In fact, Huang (2002) also shows that the multiplicity of equilibria in multilateral bargaining appears if only conditional o §ers are possible. Krishna and Serrano (1996) already showed that if only unconditional o §ers are possible (the exit game), unicity is restored. Huangís proposal has the advantage of allowing for both types of o §ers. the right to negotiate for another country cannot be interpreted literally, and it should be taken as a compromise to accept the outcome that the other party will negotiate (maybe in exchange for a reciprocal deal in another negotiation). Finally, Huangís proposal is more adequate for our model than Gomesí (2005) , as the latter selects the Örst proposer randomly and we want to assign this role to the leader.
Before moving on to the results, let us introduce additional notation to allow for a more compact presentation. The additional surplus generated by forming an intermediate coalition between countries i and j is denoted by
The surplus generated by forming the grand coalition is denoted ! abc = v(abc; % abc ) ! P i=a;b;c v(i; % # ) when it was formed starting from the all singletons situation and
when it was formed enlarging a coalition formed by countries i and j (to allow for more compact results we write ! !ij = ! abc!ij ):
For future reference, we provide the following deÖnitions. 13 DeÖnition 1 Positive Coalition externalities 14 . There are positive coalition externalities in country j when
Given our focus on climate change negotiations, we assume throughout the paper that the game has positive coalition externalities. That is, cohesiveness (called GC superadditivity in Aghion et al. (2007) ) requires the joint payo §s of all three countries to be larger when they act together, compared with under no agreement or a partial agreement (for general deÖnitions see, e.g., Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) ). Superadditivity also requires that a partial agreement increases the payo §s for the members of the agreement. As discussed below, the models with particular functions usually used to analyze IEA exhibit cohesiveness, but not always superadditivity. In fact, there are no reasons to assume that cohesiveness fails in the IEA game, and we will therefore rule this possibility out 15 .
Finally, we deÖne convex 16 /concave games for our three player case as follows (for a general deÖnition, see Shapley (1971)). 13 For simplicity, DeÖnitions 2 and 3 are only valid for games where c is involved in the coalitions. 14 This deÖnition covers cases where non-members only partially beneÖt from the formation of the coalition and cases where non-members obtain the same increase in beneÖts as members (pure public goods). 15 The literature on FTA (Aghion et al, 2007; Saggi and Yildiz 2010 and 2011) has considered the possibility that cohesiveness does not hold. We consider this possibility in Appendix B, showing that, as in the papers just mentioned, both stumbling and building block equilibria are possible. 16 Convex games are supermodular. This deÖnition shows that a game is convex if the marginal contribution of country j is not decreasing when it joins a coalition of a greater size. It is easy to show that a convex game is superadditive, although the converse is not necessarily true.
Applying the equilibrium concept developed in Huang (2002) , with some modiÖcations and extensions discussed in the Appendix, we obtain the following lemma:
The payo § for the leader in the unique equilibrium outcome is: (i) if the leader follows a multilateral path:
(ii) if the leader follows a sequential path:
Note that if the intra-stage discount factor * tends to 1, the leader obtains in multilateral bargaining its disagreement payo § plus one third of the additional surplus created if a deal is struck. As the discount factor * decreases, the share obtained by the leader increases, as the Örst mover advantage becomes more important.
If the leader follows the sequential path, it has to decide which player to approach Örst. As should be expected, the leader chooses the option that maximizes the additional surplus that it gets, in addition to its disagreement payo § (see equation 2). However, to ease the exposition we assume henceforth that the leader approaches country a Örst in the eventuality of choosing sequential bargaining (because we can rename the countries at will, this implies no loss of generality). When the leader negotiates Örst with a, it obtains a share 1 (1+') from the surplus, ! ac ; created by this negotiation. From the second negotiation the leader
That is, as the agreement will be obtained in the second negotiation stage the payo § secured has to be discounted using the inter-stage discount factor ,: From the additional surplus create by this second agreement, ! !ac ; a share equal to 1 (1+') is obtained by the coalition facg, and out of this the leader obtains a share equal to 1 (1+') (this share was decided during the negotiation in the Örst stage).
To facilitate the comparison with Aghionís et al (2007) results, let us Örst assume that there is no discounting, either within one negotiation stage or between the di §erent negotiation stages in a sequential coalition formation process. Note that, without discounting, assuming that the leader approaches a Örst implies that
Hence, the leader is interested in approaching Örst the country to which it adds more in a partial coalition and which has larger positive externalities. We obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Assume that the game is cohesive and that the discount factors tend to one. Then, the grand coalition is formed in all cases and the leader prefers multilateral bargaining i §
and sequential bargaining i § the opposite relation holds. Thus, convexity of the game and positive coalition externalities in the follower countries favor multilateral bargaining.
Proof: Appendix A.2. From equation (4) it is clear that only if ! !ac > 2! ac ; when the surplus generated by moving from the intermediate coalition to the GC is twice as large as the one generated by forming the coalition facg, is it possible to determine directly what the leader prefers (as E(b) is always non-negative with positive externalities). The intuition for this result comes from the fact that, when discount factors tend to one, in a multilateral negotiation the leader obtains one third of the total additional surplus, while in a sequential negotiation the leader obtains one half of the surplus created wit the Örst agreement, ! ac ; and one fourth of the surplus created with the second agreement, ! !ac . Thus, if the surplus of a three player coalition is clearly larger than that of a two player coalition, the leader prefers multilateral bargaining (to obtain one third instead of one fourth of this additional surplus).
To discuss the role of convexity, let us focus on a case without externalities. Then, as we have assumed that c approaches a Örst, we know that ! ac > ! bc and therefore convexity becomes a necessary condition for multilateral bargaining (because a concave game implies ! bc > ! !ac and the Örst term in equation 4 becomes negative). Finally, positive coalition externalities in country b, E(b) in the second term in equation 4, favor multilateral bargaining because the larger these externalities are the larger is the disagreement point of player b in the second negotiation of a sequential process, and the lower the payo § obtained by the leader in this second negotiation (inducing it to adopt a multilateral approach). Aghion et al. (2007) found that positive coalition externalities imply that the leader prefers multilateral bargaining. We also Önd that positive coalition externalities favor multilateral bargaining. Nevertheless, the role of externalities is not as prominent in our framework, as the leader may prefer sequential bargaining even with positive externalities as long
That is, when player b adds relatively little in the second negotiation round (this is perfectly possible as shown in section 4 below).
For the general case where the discount factors do not tend to one, we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Assume that the game is cohesive. The grand coalitions is always formed and, for a given %; the leader chooses multilateral bargaining i § ' " ' " (%) and sequential bargaining i § ' > ' " (%); with
The function ' " (%) is concave and is maximized for % " ; with 0 < % " < 1.
Although the interpretation is more di¢cult once discounting has been introduced, Proposition 2 shows that the relation between ! ac and ! !ac remains key in deÖning the set of discount factors for which the leader chooses multilateral bargaining (although the relationship between ! abc and ! !ac also impacts the outcome). As Figure 1 shows, any pair of discount factors (%; ') below the solid line induce the leader to choose a multilateral bargaining process, while any pair above this line induces a sequential process. Hence, both negotiation processes can be chosen by the leader for a given valuation function, depending on the discount factors.
The intra-stage discount factor % only a §ects the distribution of the surplus to be shared within the round, as in equilibrium the Örst o §er made by the leader is immediately accepted. In other words, as in any complete information analysis based on the RBS (or Huangís extension), if the leader chooses multilateral bargaining there is no delay and no "wasted" surplus. Nevertheless, if the leader decides to follow the sequential path, there is indeed a welfare loss given by the fact that the global agreement will not be achieved immediately (i.e., once the assumption of no discounting between stages is relaxed, global welfare is reduced if the leader chooses sequential bargaining). Given this potential global welfare loss, we now postulate that there is an international agency (e.g. the UNFCCC Secretariat) that can intervene in the negotiations. As discussed in the introduction, this mediator or facilitating agency has only the power to ináuence the amount of time that elapses between negotiation stages and/or the amount of time that elapses between o §ers in the intra-stage negotiation. That is, the agency can ináuence both discount factors, % and '; by modifying the duration of the periods in the intra-stage negotiation and the duration of the period between rounds (i.e., the agency modiÖes ! and " and thus the discount factors, although the discount rate remains obviously the same). In modeling terms, this implies having an additional stage before the game starts where the facilitating agency chooses the discount factors # and $:
Adapting the utility function of the mediator in CamiÒa and Porteiro (2009) to our game, we obtain the following deÖnition. DeÖnition 4 Given a generic vector of payo §s for players a, b and c, (P a ; P b ; P c ), the preferences of an +-type mediator, with + 2 R !0 ; are represented by the following utility function
That is, the mediator positively values the additional surplus created compared with the initial situation and negatively values the unequal distribution of this additional surplus. The relevance of the latter component of the utility function is larger the larger + becomes. We can now write:
; then multilateral bargaining is always the outcome, and if $ # (#) < 0 8# then sequential bargaining is always the outcome (i.e., the mediator cannot ináuence the outcome).
(ii) If 0 ! ! ! (") ! 1 holds for some values of ": -a purely e¢ciency seeking mediator, # = 0, favors multilateral bargaining and sets any " for which ! ! (") > 0 and any ! such that ! ! minf1; ! ! (")g.
-any mediator with # 2 (0; +1] favors multilateral bargaining and sets " ! 1 and any ! for which ! ! minf1; ! ! (")g.
Proof: Appendix A.4. As the proposition shows, there are situations where the agency has no role because the negotiation will always, or never, be multilateral. In the intermediate case where the choice of the discount factors has an impact on the outcome, as soon as the mediator is only marginally interested in equity it will favor multilateral bargaining and set " as large as possible, as this will imply that all three players obtain an equal share of the additional surplus v(abc; , abc ) (any sequential outcome is less egalitarian). That is, the mediator has an interest to speed up negotiations within each stage (i.e. increase "). However, it is also interested in delaying the start of a new negotiation round (i.e. reduce !). In fact, one of the optimal equilibria is to set ! = 0; which implies to block any possibility to negotiate in future rounds. In Figure 1 , the set of optimal pairs of discount factors for the leader are those on the bold dashed line.
On the other hand, a purely e¢ciency seeking mediator, # = 0, is also interested in multilateral bargaining, as this implies distributing v(abc; , abc ); which is the largest gross payo § if the game is cohesive, without delay. However, assuming perfect information and a subgame perfect equilibrium, the mediator has no interest in modifying " and should simply try to keep ! equal or lower than the level ! ! (") deÖned in Lemma (2). As already noted, this solution concept assumes that if one country leaves a coalition the remaining countries will continue cooperating.
Internally stable agreements
The transfers implicit in the surplus sharing agreement shown in the previous sections are sub-game perfect, and a country would therefore never break an equilibrium agreement if it assumes that the remaining countries would terminate it; nevertheless, if a country assumes that the remaining countries will continue cooperating even if it breaks the multilateral agreement, it may Önd it beneÖcial to leave the coalition. To prevent this possibility, researchers focusing on the IEA game have proposed a variety of transfer schemes that allow Potentially Internally Stable (PIS) coalitions to e §ectively become internally stable. A PIS coalition has su¢cient surplus to grant each coalition member the payo § it would obtain as a member of the fringe if it would leave the coalition and the remaining countries would continue cooperating (Carraro et al., 2006) . Carraro et al. (2006) show that any distribution of the remaining surplus (after granting each member its fringe payo §) is equally e §ective in stabilizing the PIS coalition. In our model, we assume that countries bargain over this remaining surplus.
Before proceeding, let us deÖne formally the concepts mentioned in the last paragraphs.
The results in this section crucially depend on whether intermediate coalitions "consolidate" between negotiation rounds (see footnote 8 for a justiÖcation). We say that a coalition "consolidates" if it cannot break up in subsequent negotiations. 18 If c approaches a Örst, we check whether ac is internally stable, but in the negotiation between ac and b; we only check for internal stability against defections from ac and b (i.e., we rule out the possibility that a or c go back to their singleton behavior; they can only go back to the ac coalition). In fact, if coalitions do not consolidate, the whole idea of sequential bargaining is meaningless if one requires all agreements to be internally stable because, in each negotiation round, previous agreements would play no role and players would grant each member of the future coalition its free-rider payo § under the assumption that the remaining players would continue to cooperate.
The bargaining protocol considered is the same as before and we denote % F the remaining surplus after each player receives free-riding payo §. If the leader chooses the multilateral negotiation, the remaining surplus is % F abc = v(abc; ! abc ) $ P i=a;b;c v(i; ! jk ); with % F abc < % abc for positive externalities. However, as there are no "remaining" countries that could continue cooperating in bilateral agreements, we have that ! F ij = ! ij ; and ! F !ij = ! !ij . Thus, to obtain the equivalent to Lemma 1 it su¢ces to substitute ! abc by ! F abc in equation (1), as equation (2) remains unchanged. We can now write the following proposition, which compares the results obtained under both assumptions (assuming as in Proposition (1) that " and # tend to one):
Proposition 4 Assume that internally stable agreements are required and that the discount factors tend to one. If coalitions consolidate, the GC is achieved and is stable if superadditivity holds. Furthermore, for the set of value functions for which
the subset of value functions for which multilateral bargaining is chosen is larger if internally stable agreements are required than under our benchmark assumption (the opposite is true if the relationship is reversed).
Proof: Appendix A.5. The Proposition shows that cohesiveness is no longer su¢cient to ensure the formation of the grand-coalition. The reason is that cohesiveness only implies that the GC generates more surplus than any intermediate coalition structure, but not that the additional surplus is enough to grant each country what it would obtain free-riding if all other countries continue to cooperate. However, if coalitions "consolidate", the grand coalition is still the outcome if superadditivity holds (in the Proposition, superadditivity is a su¢cient but not a necessary condition).
Condition (6) tells us that sequential bargaining is more likely to occur if internally stable agreements are required than under our benchmark assumption if externalities are smaller for the leader than for the followers. The intuition for this result is that large fringe payo §s in the follower countries imply that they obtain a larger share of the surplus in a multilateral negotiation with internally stable agreements, reducing the share obtained by the leader, while the surplus secured by the leader in a sequence of bilateral negotiation is the same under both assumptions.
To obtain the equivalent to condition (5) in Proposition (2), it is su¢cient to substitute ! abc by ! F abc . However, the concavity of the function " "F (#) now also depends on whether ! F abc is positive or negative (note that superadditivity does not guarantee that ! F abc > 0). If ! F abc > 0, the GC is PIS and " "F (#) is concave. For this case, Proposition (2) and (3) continue to hold. That is, the role played by cohesiveness corresponds now to PIS.
On the contrary, if ! F abc < 0 the GC is not PIS and Propositions (2) and (3) no longer hold. In this case, multilateral bargaining does not increase the payo § for the leader compared with the initial situation, and therefore, the leader will always choose sequential bargaining. More precisely, if superadditivity holds, the leader will choose a sequential path that will ultimately lead to the grand coalition (as, with superadditivity, ! ij > 0 and ! !ij > 0). In this case, the mediator discussed above is also not interested in promoting a multilateral negotiation, as it would be doomed. In fact, with the powers that our mediator has (ináuencing the discount factors), it could not induce the leader to choose a multilateral approach. If, in addition to ! F abc < 0; superadditivity does also not hold, i.e. ! ac < 0; the leader will stay as a singleton.
A general model
We now generalize the model to a world with many countries that are allowed to bargain following any Öxed bargaining protocol. Although the analysis becomes inevitably more complicated, the main message is that the results discussed in the previous section continue to hold, with some minor variations. Thus, readers that are not particularly interested in the technical details can skip this section and move directly to the illustration of the di §erent conÖgurations using particular functions discussed in section 4.
Let c = C 0 be the agenda setter and assume that there are N ! 2 follower countries indexed by a 1 ; :::; a N . The set of all countries, the grand coalition, is denoted by C G = fc; a 1 ; :::; a N g, and the set of all follower countries that are initially acting as singletons is denoted by C ) = fa 1 ; a 2 ; :::; a N g. We only allow for the formation of one coalition at any moment in time, although coalition size and composition may vary.
In stage one country c chooses to bargain with any subset S 1 $ C ) of the follower countries. Bargaining in stage one follows a Öxed protocol that speciÖes who has the right to propose at what time (this protocol is assumed to be cyclic). Let p 1 (t) be the proposer in period t = 1; 2; 3; ::: of stage 1 and assume that the periodicity of the protocol is p 1 < 1. From period to period there is a common discount factor , that applies. An o §er from proposer p 1 (t) consists of payo §s P (j; ) C 1 ; p 1 (t)) for all j 2 c [ S 1 = C 1 ; i.e., the members of the new coalition (to simplify notation, we denote ) C i = hfC i g ; fh 1 g ; fh 2 g ; :::; fh m gi any partition formed by a coalition C i and m countries acting as singletons). As in section 2.1, o §ers can be conditional or unconditional, allowing us to use the solution concept proposed in Huang (2002) . Conditional o §ers are binding if all the members of C 1 = c [ S 1 accept the o §er, while unconditional o §ers are binding between the proposer and the subset of countries accepting the o §er (as before, the proposer buys out the right of the accepting countries and continues negotiating). Stage 1 only ends when an agreement is accepted by all members of C 1 (otherwise, negotiations go on forever following the protocol).
As stated above, Huang (2002) analyzes a multilateral negotiation over the distribution of a cake of size 1 in one stage. The salient feature of our model is that after the negotiation in stage 1 has Önished (the case analyzed in Huang (2002)), the players can engage in a second negotiation with an additional set of players. Thus, in the second stage, coalition C 1 decides to bargain with a subset S 2 of the remaining follower countries, i.e., S 2 ! C ! nS 1 . Stage 2 bargaining follows the same logic as in stage 1, again with a Öxed protocol (not necessarily the same). From one stage to the next, the discount factor is #. An o §er from each proposer now consists of payo §s P (j; " C 2 ; p 2 (t)) for all the members of the new coalition (j 2 C 2 = C 1 [ S 2 ). The coalition C 1 formed in the previous stage makes the Örst o §er and members of the coalition decide by unanimity. The game only moves to the third stage if all countries in S 2 accept one of the o §ers received/proposed. More generally, if agreements were reached in the Örst z % 1 rounds, then in stage z the coalition C z!1 bargains with a subset S z ! C ! n [ z!1 i=1 S i of the follower countries. The Örst o §er is proposed by the coalition C z!1 and consists of a new coalition C z = C z!1 [ S z and payo §s P (j; " Cz ; p z (1)) for all j 2 C z!1 [ S z . Bargaining continues thereafter following the protocol p z . The game ends at some stage Z if the leader (or the leading coalition) decides not to make any o §er to the remaining set of countries, or if the grand coalition is formed. In addition, any of the stages z & Z can go on forever following the cyclic protocol of o §ers. A particular sequence of negotiation stages is denoted as !: When c decides at stage 1 to bargain with all the follower countries simultaneously, we say that c has chosen multilateral bargaining (i.e., S 1 = C ! ). When c chooses at stage 1 to bargain with any subset S 1 6 = C ! , we say that c has chosen sequential bargaining (as a tie-breaking rule, we assume that c prefers less stages to more and that for the same number of stages it prefers to reach an agreement with the country or countries that talk Örst).
We now deÖne our main building blocks. The additional surplus generated by moving from a coalition C z!1 to a coalition C z is denoted by & Cz!C z!1 and is deÖned as:
where v(j; ") is the value function already deÖned in section 2.1.
The share of the surplus obtained by j when the proposer number t is proposing in stage z out of the total Z stages of the sequential path is denoted by '(j; z=Z; t): Following Huang (2002), we deÖne this share as:
where A z i (t) is the set 19 of periods where player i is the proposer in the Örst cycle of the proposing protocol starting from period t (with the superscript z=Z standing for stage z out of the total number of Z stages).
Benchmark model
The following proposition shows our main result for the general model 20 :
Proposition 5 If the game is cohesive, the grand coalition is always formed, i.e., #(! ! ) = # C G : The equilibrium net payo § for the leader in the unique SPE is given by:
where ! ! is the sequence of negotiations that maximizes the payo § for the leader.
Proof: Appendix A. 6 . Proposition (5) shows that cohesiveness is su¢cient to ensure formation of the grand coalition (as Proposition (1) for the 3 player case). The intuition is that any intermediate coalition may improve its situation by sharing the additional surplus obtained by moving to the grand coalition. The proposition also shows that the o §er proposed by the leader in the Örst round of negotiations already takes into account all the rounds that will take place in equilibrium (this o §er will be immediately accepted). To ease the interpretation of Proposition (5), let us write out the RHS in equation (8):
v(c; # C O ) + ((C 0 ; 1=Z; 1)' C 1 "C 0 + .((C 0 ; 1=Z; 1)((C 1 ; 2=Z; 1)' C 2 "C 1 + ::
The Örst term indicates that the leader country always obtains at least its impasse point value, v(c; # C O ): The second term shows that it also obtains a share equal to ((C 0 ; 1=Z; 1) of the additional surplus generated in the Örst stage of the sequential process (' C 1 "C 0 ). The third term shows that the payo § obtained in the second round (if there is a second round in ! ! ) has to be discounted using the intra-stage discount factor, .: The share obtained by the leading coalition (that formed in stage 1) of the additional surplus generated by expansion of 19 More precisely, for stage z, A z j (t) = fs j t $ s $ t + p z ! 1 and p z (s) 2 D j (t)g ; for all j 2 F (t), with F (t) denoting the players still in the bargaining game of stage z and D j (t) the set of players whose right to propose is owned by j at the beginning of period t. See Huang (2002) for details. 20 The general deÖnition of cohesiveness is v( the coalition is given by !(C 1 ; 2=Z; 1): The part of this additional share relevant to the leader country is the portion that it will obtain, and this is a function of the share it secured in the Örst negotiation stage (! (C 0 ; 1=Z; 1) ). Thus, the relevant share is obtained by multiplying both shares. The remaining terms of the RHS of (8) follow the same logic for the remaining potential stages. The next Proposition shows that the role of the sign of the externalities and the convexity of the game in the general model is also similar to the case analyzed in Proposition (1) focusing, to allow the comparison, on a situation where the leader can only choose between multilateral bargaining or sequential bargaining in two stages.
Proposition 6
If sequential bargaining can only take two rounds, the leader prefers multi- %(c;1=2;1)%(C 1 ;2=2;1) > -; which generally holds (unless the bargaining protocol is much more favorable for the leader in the two sequential negotiations than in the unique multilateral negotiation). To see this, assume for simplicity that the bargaining protocol implies at all stages that the leader (or the leading coalition) talks Örst and all the followers are then allowed to talk once before the leader starts talking again (we call this the "standard" protocol hereafter). Then, the last condition becomes:
which always holds with -" 1 and S 1 + S 2 = N because the LHS is always larger than 1.
On the other hand, assuming that there are no coalition externalities to focus on the terms ináuenced by the convexity of the game, we can see that multilateral bargaining is favored by the leader if & C G !C C 1 is e 3 e 1 times & C C 1 : Finally, e 3 e 1 is larger than one as long as !(c; 1=2; 1) (1 + -!(C 1 ; 2=2; 1)) > 2!(c; 1=1; 1); that is, if the share obtained by the leader country in the Örst negotiation times the discounted share that it obtains in the second negotiation is more than twice the share obtained in the multilateral negotiation. For the "standard" protocol, e 3 e 1 is larger than one as long as
and this may or may not hold depending on the value of ! because the RHS is smaller than one. Thus, for a given value function, the smaller !, the more the leader will favor multilateral bargaining. This result also allows generalizing Propositions (2) and (3), after determining the precise bargaining protocol to be considered. Before moving on, we show that the three player model discussed above and the game in Aghion et al. (2007) are particular cases of Proposition (6) .
Example 1 To obtain the game in Section 2.1, set N = 2, a 1 = a, a 2 = b, # = ! ! 1 and the cyclic protocol to c; a; b; c; a; b and so on. This implies '(c; 1=1; 1) = 1 3 , '(c; 1=2; 1) = 1 2 , '(C 1 ; 2=2; 1) = 1 2 , !'(c; 1=2; 1)'(C 1 ; 2=2; 1) = 1 4 and, therefore, The assumption that the leader makes only take-it-or-leave-it o §ers implies in our framework that only the leader talks in the protocol. This implies '(c; 1=1; 1) = 1, '(c; 1=2; 1) = 1, '(C 1 ; 2=2; 1) = 1, !'(c; 1=2; 1)'(C 1 ; 2=2; 1) = 1, e 1 = 0, e 2 = 1 and e 3 = 0: Hence, equation (9) simpliÖes to E(S 0 !S 1 ) = E(b) > 0, and whether multilateral or sequential bargaining is adopted only depends on the sign of the externalities.
Internally stable agreements
As in section 2.2, the additional surplus to be shared by moving from a coalition C z!1 to a coalition C z is, now, what is left over after granting each member of the new coalition C z its free-riding gross payo §. We denote this surplus as ( F Cz!C z!1 and deÖne it as:
Feasible negotiation sequences, , !; are those where in every stage ( F C z(!) !C z(!)!1 > 0 (the accent above indicates values obtained requiring internally stable agreements). The following proposition extends the result in Proposition (4) that cohesiveness is no longer su¢cient to ensure the formation of the grand-coalition, but that superadditivity is.
Proposition 7 If coalitions consolidate in sequential bargaining and internally stable agreements are required, the GC is achieved and is stable if superadditivity holds, i.e., !(! ! ) = ! C G : The equilibrium net payo § for the leader in the unique SPE is given by:
where % ! ! is the sequence of negotiations that maximizes the payo § for the leader.
Proof: Appendix A.8.
The intuition for the proof is that any intermediate coalition can always follow a one by one enlargement process because in a sequence of bilateral agreements superadditivity ensures that each enlargement is proÖtable for both parts (as before, superadditivity is a su¢cient condition). In fact, if only two parties are negotiating, requiring internally stable agreements and our benchmark assumption lead to the same outcome, because it is not possible to free-ride on the "remaining" countries once one of the two countries defects.
Generalizing the rest of Proposition (4) to more than three players would require taking into account the di §erences in the sequential bargaining process under both types of assumptions (although smaller fringe payo §s of the leader would still favor sequential bargaining).
Finally, as for the three players case, multilateral bargaining only yields for the leader a payo § larger than its singleton value if the GC is PIS, or if
and, hence, if this does not hold the leader will always choose a sequential path.
Illustration with particular functions
This sub-section illustrates the implications of the model previously discussed using the quadratic functions for heterogeneous countries deÖned in McGinty (2007) , which are in turn an adaptation of the functions used by Barrett (1994) for homogeneous countries. In agreement with Barrett (1994) , Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and McGinty (2007) we assume that only one coalition can be formed, which assigns abatement e §orts to its members in order to maximize the gross payo § of the coalition, and that the remaining countries act as singletons. However, we do not assume, as did McGinty (2007) and previously Barrett (1994) , that the cooperating coalition acts as a Stackelberg leader 21 . We assume instead that the cooperating coalition plays a Nash equilibrium against the remaining singletons if no agreement is reached to enlarge the coalition. The other di §erence is that we model negotiations explicitly and recognize that delays are costly (a climate change agreement today is more e §ective than the same agreement two decades later). As before, we consider a set of C G = fc; a 1 ; :::; a N g heterogeneous countries. Global beneÖt is a concave function B(Q) = (()Q # (Q 2 =2)) where Q = P i2C G q i stands for global abatement and q i for individual abatement. Parameters ) and ( are strictly positive. We assume that each nation receives a share of the beneÖt equal to , i , where , i > 0 8i 2 C G and P i2C G , i = 1. All countries are assumed to have convex abatement cost functions depending only on their individual abatement, with & i > 0. Therefore, the individual gross payo § (before any transfers) is given by:
The following proposition is useful to analyze this game since it yields the value function:
Proposition 8 Assume that a coalition C K with K members has been formed. The individual abatements for signatories and for non-signatories resulting from the Nash equilibrium between the coalition and the singletons on the fringe are given by:
The gross payo §s of the Nash equilibrium are:
with
Proof: Appendix A.9 21 Assumption of a Stackelberg leader implicitly assumes that the coalition is the largest player and has therefore more power to commit than the rest of the countries. Nevertheless, with asymmetric countries this is not necessarily the case because a group of small countries may form a coalition which is too small to act as a Stackelberg leader.
To illustrate the di §erent conÖgurations that can appear we provide now some simulation results 22 . To simplify, we focus on a game with 5 players 23 (one leader, c; and 4 followers a i ; i = 1::4). Before moving to Monte-Carlo simulations, we discuss in more detail three examples, assuming in all cases & ! 1; ' = 5 and ( = 50. On the costs side we denote & " (& c ; & a 1 ; & a 2 ; & a 3 ; & a 4 ) and consider two parameter sets: & l " (100; 80; 75; 70; 25) ; implying that the leader has larger abatement costs, and & f " (25; 80; 75; 70; 100). On the beneÖts side, we denote * " (* c ; * a 1 ; * a 2 ; * a 3 ; * a 4 ) and consider three cases: (i) an equal distribution of beneÖts * e " (0:2; 0:2; 0:2; 0:2; 0:2; 0:2);(ii) a distribution with one large follower * f " (0:03; 0:08; 0:08; 0:08; 0:73) ; and (iii) a distribution with one large leader * l " (0:73; 0:08; 0:08; 0:08; 0:03) :
To get a feeling of the likelihood of the di §erent paths, we also perform Monte-Carlo simulations 24 , with 1000 repetitions. The game is superadditive 25 in 584 of the 1000 cases considered and, as expected, always cohesive. Table 1 shows the results for our examples. As the game is cohesive, the grand coalition is always formed. However, the path chosen by the leader depends on the parameters of the model. For example, for + ! 1; the leader chooses a multilateral approach with (* e ; & l ) and a sequential approach with (* f ; & l ). As our theoretical model has highlighted, lowering the discount factors ináuences these results, reducing the number of stages with + = 0:90 for (* f ; & l ); and ultimately inducing the leader to choose a multilateral approach for (* f ; & l ) (for values of + below 0:4). Thus, if this option is available, the mediator would like to enlarge the period between negotiations stages, ,; to make sure that + = e !r(t < 0:40 for (* f ; & l ).
Benchmark model
The Monte-Carlo simulations conÖrm that sequential bargaining is by no means an exception, as sequential bargaining is chosen by the leader in 857 out of 1000 cases. Although not in one step, in all these cases the GC is the Önal outcome. As the game is cohesive, "all singletons" or partial cooperation are never the Önal outcome, as predicted by Proposition (5) , so that multilateral bargaining is the option selected in the remaining 143 cases 22 All simulations have been done using Scilab 5.3.3. Codes are available from the authors upon request. 23 Although we focus only on the Öve player case to ease the exposition, one can also Önd cases where sequential bargaining is chosen with three players. 24 ! values are randomly selected, ensuring that P ! i = 1: The remaining parameters are randomly selected from the following intervals: 25 Note that although convexity always holds superadditivity does not hold generally. Nevertheless, it holds for a sub-class of the payo § function shown in (11) that has been used frequently in the analysis of IEA, namely the case of identical players with linear beneÖts and quadratic (Breton et al., 2006) . Thus, for the linear-quadratic payo § function, Propositions 5 and 7 imply that the GC is achieved under both assumptions considered, although not necessarily in one step.
(yielding, again, the GC). 
Note: The second column shows the path chosen for the leader when ! ! 1; the third the path chosen for ! = 0:9 and the fourth the maximum level of ! for which multilateral bargaining is the outcome. In each cell, commas separate the agreements formed in the sequence (excluding c).
Internally stable agreements
We also obtain multilateral and sequential bargaining under this assumption. For (# l ; & f ) the GC is PIS and the leader chooses multilateral bargaining even for ! ! 1: On the contrary, for (# e ; & l ) and (# f ; & l ) the GC is not PIS and the leader chooses always a sequential approach, as a multilateral agreement is not possible under this assumption if the GC is not PIS. The Monte-Carlo simulations show that the leader selects sequential bargaining in 926 cases. Out of these cases, only in 7 cases is the GC not achieved. Multilateral bargaining is selected in 55 cases, yielding always the GC when it is selected. Finally, the leader decides to remain as a singleton in 12 cases. That is, only in 19 cases is the GC not achieved. This is a remarkable result considering that the GC is PIS in a multilateral setting only in 103 out of the 1000 cases considered.
Conclusion
This paper has discussed a model of gradual coalition formation with positive externalities in which a leading country endogenously decides whether to negotiate multilaterally or sequentially over climate change. Our analysis has shown that the two features driving the results are how much bargaining power the followers have, and the assumption made about the behavior of the remaining players if one player breaks an agreement.
Assuming followers with no bargaining power (take-it-or-leave-it o §ers from the leader) and that agreements are terminated if one player breaks them, Aghion et al. (2007) show that the grand coalition will be achieved and that the leader would always prefer a multilateral negotiation process. Relaxing the bargaining power assumption, we have highlighted the role played by the convexity of the game, showing that the leader may prefer a sequential path even with positive externalities. This extends considerably the cases where sequential negotiations may be chosen and helps explain the recent trend toward bilateral or regional climate change negotiations.
Requiring agreements to be internally stable, we have shown that reaching a stable GC is only guaranteed if superadditivity holds, and that the leader chooses sequential bargaining more often if its free-rider payo § is small. We have also shown that even if the grand coalition is not stable in a multilateral setting, the sequential approach may reach a stable global agreement. Furthermore, our simulations have shown that this is in fact the case for most parameter values. For this path to be feasible, coalitions need to consolidate. In reallife negotiations, this implies giving intermediate coalitions some time to build up common institutions, such an emissions trading market, to make it impossible for them to break up in subsequent negotiations to enlarge cooperation. This clearly shows that a multilateral approach is not necessarily the best strategy to negotiate a climate change agreement, and provides a rationale for focusing on linking the European emissions trading system to other systems in a sequential process.
[32] Saggi A Appendix (proofs)
A.1 Lemma 1
For multilateral bargaining there is a single stage and the bargaining game is similar to the one analyzed in Theorem 3 in Huang (2002) , except that (i) the surplus shared is not 1, but the surplus generated by moving from the all singletons situation to the grand coalition and (ii) the reservation payo §s are not zero. As these changes do not modify the proof substantially, it is omitted (the full proof is available from the authors). Thus, from this analysis we know that the equilibrium is unique, that the Örst o §er made by the leader will be immediately accepted and that the o §er grants each player j its disagreement payo § v(c; # ! ) plus a share %(j; m) of the additional surplus created through the agreement. For the cyclical protocol assumed, the share obtained by the leader is given by:
where A m i (t) is the set of periods where player c is the proposer in the Örst cycle of the negotiation protocol (which is 1 as the protocol is c; a; b; c; a; b:::) starting from period t = 1. For a more general presentation of this share see section 3. Hence, the payo § obtained by the leader in equilibrium, where the Örst o §er is immediately accepted, is given by equation (1) .
For bilateral bargaining, the share obtained in the Örst (and in the second) stage of the game in equilibrium is given by:
If the leader country approaches Örst a, in equilibrium it obtains its disagreement payo §, The leader knows at the beginning of the game, that out of this surplus obtained by the coalition facg, it obtains a share !(c; s); which needs to be discounted using the discount factor +:
The payo § that the leader obtains under sequential bargaining if it approaches b Örst is calculated using the same reasoning. The leader approaches Örst the player with which it obtains a higher payo §, yielding equation (2).
A.2 Proposition 1
The leader prefers multilateral if P (c; ( abc ; m) # P (c; ( abc ; s) > 0; where both expressions are obtained applying Lemma (1), and taking the limit as the discount factors tend to 1. Assuming that the leader approaches a Örst, or that ) ac + E(a) > ) bc + E(b), this inequality simpliÖes to (4) . Positive externalities in the follower countries favor multilateral bargaining because they increase the second term in (4) . To see that convexity also favors multilateral bargaining note that it is a necessary condition when there are no externalities. A concave game implies ) bc > ) "ac and, as c approaches a Örst, we know that ) ac > ) bc : Thus, we know that for a concave game ) ac > ) "ac , making the Örst term in (4) negative. The same argument holds if the conditions are met for the leader to approach b Örst.
A.3 Proposition 2
From Lemma (1) we know that, assuming that c approaches a Örst in sequential bargaining, c chooses multilateral if P (c; ( abc ; m) # P (c; ( abc ; s) > 0: Solving this equation for + equation
the function is concave if & "ac > 0 and convex if & "ac < 0: Given that
2 is a continuously decreasing function that starts at 1 for # = 0 and takes a value of zero for # = 1; and by cohesiveness & "ac > 0 and & abc > & ac , the Örst derivative is positive for low values of # and negative for large values, implying that " ! (#) is maximized for # ! ; with 0 < # ! < 1.
A.4 Proposition 3
If " ! (#) " 1 never holds, then " " " ! always holds; and if 0 " " ! (#) never holds then " " " ! never holds. An e¢ciency seeking mediator, ( = 0; prefers a multilateral negotiation because it yields an immediate agreement with P i2a;b;c P (i; * abc ; m) = v(abc; * abc ); while with sequential bargaining, at least one period elapses, implying that P i2a;b;c P (i; * abc ; s) < v(abc; * abc ); with " < 1: If 0 < " ! (#) < 1 holds for some values of #, by Proposition (2) the leader will select multilateral bargaining for any " " " ! and the agreement will be reached immediately with the Örst o §er. Thus, irrespective of the value of # and as long as " " " ! , there will be no welfare loss. However, if ( > 0, the mediator will choose the most egalitarian outcome out of the set for which multilateral bargaining is chosen by the leader, and this is achieved by setting # ! 1: Irrespective of the value of (, the mediator has no incentive to induce sequential bargaining, as this reduces the e¢ciency and cannot improve the equity of the sharing compared with a multilateral deal with # ! 1:
A.5 Proposition 4
Using this assumption multilateral bargaining yields the following payo §s for the leader: 
A.6 Proposition 5
The proof has three steps. First, we deÖne in Lemma 2 the equilibrium outcome under multilateral bargaining, since this is a special case of the analysis in Huang (2002) . Then we show the equilibrium transfer under sequential bargaining, in Lemma 3, and Önally we show that the grand coalition is always achieved.
A.6.1 Step 1. Equilibrium outcome of the multilateral bargaining process Lemma 2 Assume that c has decided at stage 1 to bargain with all follower countries simultaneously (i.e. c has chosen multilateral bargaining and C 1 = C G ). The unique equilibrium outcome is reached in period 1 of the unique stage and is given by
As already mentioned for the three players case, if the leader chooses multilateral bargaining the bargaining game is similar to the one analyzed in Theorem 3 in Huang (2002), with the modiÖcations discussed above. As these changes do not modify the (rather long) proof substantially, it is omitted (the full proof is available from the authors).
A.6.2 Step 2. Equilibrium outcome of the sequential bargaining process Lemma 3 Assume that c has decided at stage 1 to follow a sequential bargaining process. The unique equilibrium in any stage z of the game is:
Suppose that in stage Z the coalition negotiates with all the remaining players. The reservation payo § of the coalition, which includes the leader, is the payo § obtained in the previous negotiation in phase Z ! 1: P ! (C Z"1 ; # C Z!1 ; p Z"1 (1)). Similarly, the remaining players have a reservation payo § of P ! (j; # C Z!1 ; p Z"1 (1)); for all j 2 [S Z : Hence, by Lemma (2) the equilibrium o §er proposed by the coalition in period 1 of stage Z and immediately accepted is P ! (j; # C Z ; p Z=Z (1)) = P ! (j; # C Z!1 ; p Z"1 (1)) + '(j; Z; 1)( C Z "C Z!1 , for all j 2
In the previous stage (Z !1), the reservation payo § of the players is P ! (j; # C Z!2 ; p Z"2 (1)), for all j 2 C Z"2 [ S Z"1 ; and the surplus shared is (i) the surplus produced by moving from C Z"2 to C Z"1 plus (ii) the discounted additional surplus to be obtained at stage Z (discounted using the between-stages factor )). Thus, following a similar reasoning as in Lemma (2) the payo § for j in stage Z ! 1 is, for all j 2 C Z"2 [ S Z"1 ; P ! (j; # C Z!1 ; p Z"1=Z (1)) = P ! (j; # C Z!2 ; p Z"2=Z (1)) + +'(j; Z ! 1; 1)
<
:
'(C i"1 ; i; 1)
= ;
More generally, for any stage z the equilibrium outcome is: P ! (j; # Cz ; p z=Z (1)) = P ! (j; # C z!1 ; p z"1 (1)) + +'(j; z; 1)
) and this can be rewritten as in (8) . Given the tie-breaking rule assumed this equilibrium is unique since multiple equilibria only appear if the leader obtains the same payo § with di §erent negotiation sequences.
A.6.3 Step 3. Grand coalition
The generalized deÖnition of cohesiveness implies that v(C G ; # C G ) > X j2' v(j; #) for every # 6 = # C G : Any coalition smaller than the GC prefers moving to the GC in one step to staying as an intermediate coalition (it may also prefer moving in several stages, but to show that the GC forms it is su¢cient to show that it prefers to move in one stage). Suppose that at stage T a coalition has been formed with m < c [ N members. This coalition may o §er the remaining players a share '(j; 1=1; 1) of ( C G "C T , which will be accepted and increase the payo § for all players since ( C G "C T > 0 by cohesiveness.
A.7 Proposition 6
From Lemma (2) we know that the payo § for the leader from multilateral bargaining is P (c; " C G ; p 1=1 (1)) = v(j; " C 0 ) + ((c; 1; 1)) C G !C 0 . From Lemma (3), we know that the leader obtains from a sequential bargaining process with 2 stages: P (c; " C G ; p 1=2 (1)) = v(j; " C 0 ) + ((c; 1=2; 1)) C 1 !C 0 + (((c; 1=2; 1)((C 1 ; 2=2; 1)) C G !C 1 :
The leader prefer sequential bargaining if P (c; " C G ; p 1=2 (1)) > P (c; " C G ; p 1=1 (1)); or if (9).
A.8 Proposition 7
Assume consolidation of coalitions. To show that the grand coalition forms if superadditivity holds, suppose that coalition C T has been formed at stage T with m < c [ N members and that there are which is immediately accepted by h 1 and positive by superadditivity (because ) F C T [h 1 !C T = ) C T [h 1 !C T ). This holds for the initial coalition structure where no coalitions are formed and for all intermediate coalitions until the grand coalition is achieved. That is, as in bilateral negotiations the surplus to be shared between the countries is the same under both assumptions, the leader can at least choose a bilateral bargaining path to reach the grand coalition and no intermediate coalition will be interested in interrupting the bilateral sequence until the grand coalition. Nevertheless, cohesiveness is no longer su¢cient to ensure that the grand coalition is formed. The reason is that the payo § just deÖned is not necessarily positive if only cohesiveness holds. In addition, the leader cannot achieve the GC directly, because cohesiveness does not ensure that all the free-riding gross payo §s can be allocated to each country. I.e., ) F C G !C T may be negative even if cohesiveness holds. To obtain equation (10) follow the proof to obtain equation (8) substituting ) ! ! with ) F # ! ! and v(c; " C O ) with v(c; " C 1 !fcg ): In addition, note that if no sequence + ! yields a positive V the leader remains as a singleton.
A.9 Proposition 8
We consider a Nash equilibrium between the coalition of size K and the (N + 1) ! K non signatories acting as singletons. The program of the signatories coalition is to maximize
while the (N + 1) ! K singletons maximize
The reaction function for a signatory is q s
and for a non-
After substitution, individual abatements for signatories, q s i ; and non-signatories, q ns j ; are the ones shown in equation (12) . The payo §s shown in equations (13) and (14) of the main text are obtained substituting these values into equation (11) , taking into account that v(C K ; ' C K ) = P i2K # s i and v(j; ' C K ) = # ns i :
B Cohesiveness fails
In the main text, we have assumed that cohesiveness holds. This is a rather mild requirement for most public goods and is generally accepted in IEA analyses. Nevertheless, the literature on FTA (Aghion et al, 2007; Saggi and Yildiz 2010 and 2011) has considered the possibility that cohesiveness (or GC superadditivity) does not hold, and we will therefore analyze it. Cohesiveness can fail because ( abc < 0 and/or ( "ij < 0: As in the papers just mentioned, the consequence is that both stumbling and building block equilibria are possible. If ( abc < 0, a multilateral agreement is not possible. However, if ( ac > 0 and ( "ac > 0 sequential bargaining will yield the GC, and the intermediate coalition is a building block. In fact, if the discount rate 1 is su¢ciently low, sequential bargaining may lead to the GC even if ( ac < 0; as long as ( "ac > 0 and the gain in the second stage is enough to compensate the loss in the Örst stage. Hence, the mediator could have a role to play if it can decrease 1.
If ( "ac < 0 and ( abc > 0, multilateral bargaining would yield the grand coalition, while a partial agreement between a and c would be a stumbling block that would avoid achievement of the GC. A purely e¢ciency seeking mediator would have no incentive to favor multilateral bargaining, as it would reduce the aggregated payo § of the three countries. Nevertheless, if the mediator has an ! > 0, it may be interested in promoting multilateral bargaining, as the intermediate situation can be very unequal. Finally, if " !ac < 0 and " abc < 0; the GC would not be achieved following a sequential nor a multilateral approach.
